Trusted Virtual Machines: Ensuring the Integrity of Virtual Machines in the Cloud by Raghu Yeluri & Enrique Castro-Leon
161
Chapter 8
Trusted Virtual Machines: 
Ensuring the Integrity of 
Virtual Machines in the 
Cloud
In Chapters 3 and 4, we described how a service provider can ensure that the 
infrastructure on which the workloads and applications are instantiated has boot 
integrity, and how these workloads can be placed in trusted pools with compute assets 
exhibiting demonstrated trust that is rooted in hardware. This model provides an 
excellent framework for a trusted compute infrastructure, but it’s not sufficient for the 
cloud. Cloud data centers today almost invariably run virtualized. Stopping the chain 
of trust at the bare hypervisor is clearly insufficient; that is but the proverbial tip of the 
iceberg. Protection needs to be extended to support the multi-tenancy and virtualized 
networks of the cloud. Extending the chain of trust described to encompass these 
virtualized resources, embodied in the concept of trusted virtual machines, is what this 
chapter is about.
Critical concerns for cloud users are for protecting workloads and data in the 
cloud and from the cloud, and for ensuring trust and integrity for virtual machine 
images launched on a service provider’s cloud. For virtual machine and workload data 
protection, cloud-user organizations need a method to securely place and use their 
workloads and data in the cloud.
Current provisioning and deployment models include either storing the virtual 
machine and application images and data in the clear—in other words, unencrypted—or 
having these images and data encrypted by the keys controlled by the service provider, 
which are likely applied uniformly to all the tenants. Increasingly, however, virtual 
machine images—effectively containers for operating system and application images, 
configuration files, data, and other entities—need confidentiality protection in a multi-tenant 
cloud environment. These images need to be encrypted by keys that the tenant controls, 
and that can be decrypted for provisioning by the keys also under tenant control, all done 
in a manner that’s transparent to the cloud service provider.
CHAPTER 8 ■ TRusTEd ViRTuAl MACHinEs: EnsuRing THE inTEgRiTy of ViRTuAl MACHinEs in THE Cloud
162
Additionally, tenants would like the chain of trust and the boot integrity of these 
virtual machines assessed by the attestation authority in the infrastructure or the cloud 
before they are launched and begin participating on the network to satisfy service 
requests. With the tenant-controlled encryption and decryption, and integrity attestation 
of virtual machines, there can be clear security statements made about the confidentiality 
and protection of these application workloads in the cloud.
With interest in these topics driving cloud security considerations, Intel has reached 
out to the independent software vendor and cloud service provider community to 
develop a set of technology components and associated solutions architecture built on 
top of the trusted compute pools foundation to build proof points for these usage models. 
These are reference and prototype demonstrations that, it is hoped, will light a path to 
deployable solutions that address the concerns voiced above.
Requirements for Trusted Virtual Machines
Organizations are clearly leveraging the cost-saving (from capX reduction) and flexibility 
benefits of virtualizing their data centers, as opposed to the traditional deployment 
model in dedicated, corporate-owned infrastructure resources. The ease with which 
virtual machines can be created, deployed, and moved brings a multitude of security 
issues not present in those traditional, physical data centers, however. Protecting data 
and applications in traditional data centers is fairly well understood. In addition to 
security appliances and measures like firewalls, intrusion detection, intrusion prevention, 
anti-malware controls, encryption, access controls, monitoring, and logging, there are 
physical security measures like locked cabinets and cages, and these all go a long way 
toward defending sensitive data.
Software-defined virtualized data centers are very different, though. The unit of 
deployment is a virtual machine, and the entire lifecycle, connectivity, and storage 
associated with these virtual machines is defined, managed, monitored, and secured 
using software. The ability of virtual machines holding sensitive and confidential data 
to be easily moved or replicated in a matter of seconds requires special solutions and 
protections designed for virtual and cloud computing environments. Most Infrastructure 
as a Service (IaaS) providers either store the virtual machines in the clear—meaning no 
encryption—or encrypt them with keys that they control. This may be acceptable for 
some tenants, but most public or hybrid cloud tenants are concerned about leakage of 
data and sensitive information stored in some of these virtual machines. For example, 
insider threats at the service provider constitute legitimate concerns for organizations. 
Organizations are also concerned about the privacy of data running and processed in 
the virtual machines, and they must demonstrate the ability to measure and control risk, 
owing to the significant implications for meeting legal and fiduciary responsibilities.
Another essential aspect of the virtual machine lifecycle is decommissioning.  
A cloud service provider replicates virtual machines to multiple locations and availability 
zones as a matter of policy, ensuring later availability and for disaster recovery. While 
this allows service providers to comply with demanding SLAs, it raises security risks. 
Geographically dispersed copies of virtual machines can also proliferate sensitive data, 
credentials, and information, leaving it floating in the cloud. Additionally, a benefit end 
users get from cloud use is the ability to switch providers. Former customers need to be 
assured that they can make a clean break when they switch providers. This includes the 
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ability to destroy any virtual machine and associated data left at the former provider, 
including backups. Most cloud service providers can’t promise that, if only because in the 
current state of the art there are no standards for proving that disks and backup media are 
properly wiped before disposal or repair.
Standards organizations and compliance regulation bodies have started to 
acknowledge these needs for requirements. The Payment Card Industry (PCI) Standards 
Council recently released an information addendum to the latest data security standard 
(DSS) specification regarding vulnerabilities laid to virtualization, including exposure of 
personally identifiable information (PII) and credit card information residing in the virtual 
machines. The addendum also highlights vulnerabilities with regard to snapshot files and 
virtual machine backups. The dormant virtual machines in these backups can lie there for 
years, to be spun up anytime and anywhere, exposing the data and sensitive information.
Consequently, in addition to the encryption of application data, new PCI guidelines 
recommend encrypting virtual machine images with an operating system and 
applications with keys managed securely to reduce the footprint of any sensitive data left 
behind. Figure 8-1 illustrates the concept of tenant-controlled virtual machine encryption 
and decryption.
Figure 8-1. Tenant-controlled virtual machine encrytion and decryption
In addition to confidentiality protection, organizations would like to verify the 
integrity of virtual machines before launching them. For instance, if a hardened Linux 
virtual machine configuration is available, and a user wants it, the user will want a 
proof of this machine’s being used. Doing so within the cloud model is harder than 
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within a corporate-owned infrastructure, since the tenant organization doesn’t own 
the infrastructure. A chain of trust rooted in hardware, with continuous monitoring of 
the integrity of infrastructure, the workloads, and virtual machines, can provide the 
assurance the organization wants.
All of this can be distilled into three key requirements that need to be in place to 
ensure integrity and confidentiality of these virtual machines in a virtual and cloud 
environment:
•	 Virtual machines must be launched on servers with provable 
boot integrity. The trusted compute pools usages, platform/host 
attestation, and geo-fencing solutions described in Chapters 3, 4, 
and 5 address this requirement. This is foundational.
•	 Virtual machine images must be encrypted in transit, at rest, 
and during execution. This is essential to preserve confidentiality 
and secrets. The keys are under the control of the tenant, and they 
are released (key policy management) to the service provider only 
when they provide attestation that the virtual machine images are 
being launched on trusted servers.
•	 Launch and provision only qualified and attested virtual 
machine images. Virtual machines about to launch must attest 
their launch integrity with the infrastructure.
In the rest of the chapter we’ll cover usages, a conceptual architecture, and a 
reference implementation that addresses requirements for service providers to offer 
protection of tenant payloads. Before we jump into details, though, we have to look at the 
basics of a virtual machine image to understand what needs to be encrypted and what 
needs to be measured and attested. We will look at the various virtual image formats 
and also consider virtual machine templates, a standard operating procedure for cloud 
operators to instantiate virtual machines.
Virtual Machine Images
Virtual machine images come in two different formats: disk and container. Hypervisor 
management tools accept both formats, and so do most of the cloud management 
platforms. However, as of this writing, the OpenStack Image Service (Glance) and 
other projects do not support the container format. It is possible, however, to associate 
metadata with images using OpenStack Image Service properties (key/value pairs).
The disk format of a virtual machine image is the format of the underlying disk 
image. Virtual machines can have different formats for laying out the information 
contained in a virtual machine disk image, as outlined in Table 8-1.
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A container format indicates whether the virtual machine image is in a file format 
that also contains metadata about the actual virtual machine. The container format for a 
virtual machine image is a self-contained package with two items:
Metadata about the virtual machine.•	
One or more virtual disks containing the operating system, •	
applications and data. The virtual disk is on the formats as 
described above.
The image by itself can be a representation of one virtual machine image or could 
be a composition of multiple related virtual machine images pertaining to a multi-tier 
service or distributed application workload.
Let’s look at the details of the image components. The metadata included in the 
virtual machine image includes specific information about the operation information 
about the virtual machines, including:
Metadata describing server resources needed to run the image: •	
number of CPUs, either dedicated or shared, and memory 
requirements for the workloads running in the virtual machine.
Metadata articulating the goals and constraints. This •	
comprehends performance and availability goals and any 
placement constraints, such as security isolation.
Table 8-1. Virtual Disk Image Formats
Type Description
raw An unstructured disk image format
vhd VHD, a common disk format used by virtual machine monitors from 
VMWare, Xen, Linux/KVM, Microsoft, VirtualBox, and others
vmdk Common disk format supported by many common virtual machine 
monitors
vdi Format supported by VirtualBox virtual machine monitor and the QEMU 
emulator
ISO An archive format for the data contents of an optical disc, such as CD-ROM
qcow2 Format supported by the QEMU emulator that can expand dynamically 
and that supports Copy on Write
AKI An Amazon kernel image (as used in Amazon Web Services EC2)
ARI Amazon ramdisk image
AMI Amazon machine image
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Metadata describing virtual machine configuration variables like •	
IP addresses and application configuration parameters.
Metadata describing the package integrity, like SHA1/SHA2 •	
hashes of the virtual disks and modules.
Virtualization management software uses metadata information to create the right 
type of virtual machine container with the required platform resources. Once the virtual 
disk image, built as a bootable image, is copied and made accessible to the physical host 
system, the virtual machine is started from the bootable disk image.
The Open Virtualization Format (OVF)
Virtual machine images can be assembled and delivered in many ways. To ensure 
interoperability of virtual machines and seamless deployment and management across 
virtualization platforms, standardization of the virtual machine distribution format is 
essential. That is exactly what Open Virtualization Format (OVF) is. OVF is a hypervisor 
agnostic virtual machine packaging and distribution format, standardized by the 
Distributed Management Task Force (DMTF). It provides a complete description of a 
single virtual machine or a complex multi-virtual machine software solution package. It is 
extensible so that DMTF or third parties can add features and extensions to it. OVF goes 
beyond just the description and virtual hardware attributes.
Open Virtualization Format allows a virtual appliance/ISV vendor to add items like a 
EULA, comments about the virtual machine, boot parameters, minimum requirements, 
and a host of other features. OVF specification calls for an OVF descriptor, typically called 
the OVF envelope, which is an XML file describing the software in the OVF package. 
The OVF descriptor has ten core sections for metadata, such as the virtual hardware, 
EULA, product information, and so on. In order to support the extensibility, the OVF 
specification provides extension points. These custom extension points may be used to 
specify items such as multiple networks, specific firewalls, firewall rules required for 
the virtual machines, and the setup of a load balancer for multiple instances of virtual 
machines. A virtual machine author can describe in “levels” the conformance to the 
OVF specification as part of the OVF envelope. Level 1 indicates that there are no custom 
extensions, Level 2 indicates that there are custom extensions but they are optional, and 
Level 3 indicates that the custom extensions are required. This information helps the 
deployer to figure out the appropriate set of virtualization environments to deploy the 
virtual machines.
Intel has been working with the industry to deliver a solution architecture and 
implementations that address security requirements in virtualized environments. The 
usage models are called trusted virtual machines and are code-named Mystery Hill 
(abbreviated MH). The usage models cover the tenant-controlled encryption of virtual 
machines with tenant-controlled key management , decryption of the virtual machine 
images and data on servers or hosts with attested integrity and hardware roots of 
trust, and the attestation of the virtual machines prior to their launch. In this section, 
we discuss a reference architecture, with details about the key components of the 
architecture and the workflow. Following this, we present a reference implementation in 
the OpenStack cloud environment.
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A Conceptual Architecture for Trusted Virtual 
Machines
Figure 8-2 shows the conceptual architecture for trusted virtual machines. There are four 
key elements needed to enable the usages described in the previous sections:
1. Mystery Hill (MH) client
2. MH key management and policy server (KMS)
3. MH plug-in that runs on the host or server
4. Mt. Wilson trust attestation server technology
Figure 8-2. Conceptual architecture for trusted virtual machines
The conceptual architecture calls for loosely coupled components with well-defined 
APIs and interfaces. Let’s look at each of these in detail.
Mystery Hill (MH) Client
The Mystery Hill (MH) client is an application that runs under tenant or organization 
control and that carries many functions. It is the primary mechanism by which the service 
owner (tenant) encrypts the virtual machine images, generates the module manifest for 
the VMs (list of all files that need to be measured and verified), generates SHA-1/SHA-2 
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hash values of the modules (whitelist), and specifies the VM trust policies. The MH client 
interfaces with the key management server (KMS), which is assumed to be a service under 
tenant or organization control. The MH client also interfaces with the cloud management 
software, such as Amazon AWS EC2 or OpenStack, to be able to upload the encrypted virtual 
machine images and the meta-data onto the image server for provisioning and launch.
The VM payload includes one or more encrypted virtual machine images and the 
metadata. The metadata contains:
Module manifest and hash of the modules, signed by the trust •	
authority (like Mt. Wilson)
Key ID (data encryption key ID) to determine the decryption key •	
in the KMS store
URL for the KMS from where the decryption key can be obtained•	
VM trust launch policies•	
We will cover the trust launch policies in a later section. The MH client generates a 
new symmetric encryption key for each VM that is being encrypted, wraps the symmetric 
key using an asymmetric key (provided by the KMS), and posts the wrapped key to 
the KMS. The metadata is stored in either the OVF envelope for the virtual machine (if 
the container format of virtual machine image is used) or as additional attributes or 
properties of the image server (for disk-based virtual machine image formats). Figure 8-3 
shows the OVF envelope with the metadata extensions.
Figure 8-3. OVF extensions for VM encryption
Mystery Hill Key Management and Policy Server (KMS)
The Mystery Hill key management and policy server (KMS) is the core key generation 
and management service, designed to allow control of key generation and management 
functions by the tenant organization. It provides the standard web services interface 
for generating the keys and delivering those keys to the MH client after successful 
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authentication, to allow an MH client to encrypt virtual machine images. It also provides 
the decryption key URLs to the MH client to be included in the OVF envelopes. We 
recommend for the KMS to use a hardware security module (HSM) for the generation, 
storage, and processing of the keys. The second function of the key management 
and policy server is to evaluate trust policies before decryption keys are handed to 
the requesting entity. The trust policies can include user roles, license verification, 
application certification, server or host platform integrity and attestation, and geolocation 
or geo-fencing policies, as well as network attributes.
Mystery Hill Plug-in
The Mystery Hill plug-in is a set of two components that reside and run with the 
hypervisor on the host/server on which the virtual machines are being deployed. These 
components are:
•	 MH Agent. Part of the platform trust computing base (TCB), 
it performs the functions for decryption of the tenant virtual 
machines and integrates with the virtualization and cloud 
management environment. In OpenStack environments, the MH 
agent integrates with the Nova compute node service to intercept 
encrypted virtual machine launch requests to the hypervisor, 
obtains the decryption key from the MH key management 
service after the server or node attests to its integrity with a trust 
attestation authority, and decrypts the virtual machine images. It 
provides local (and transparent) encryption of the decrypted VM 
images on the compute node disk prior to the launch, so they are 
not in the clear, even for a short time prior to launch.
•	 MH Measuring and Quoting Agent. This component, also part 
of the platform TCB, measures the virtual machine images, 
verifies the measurements against the whitelist, and also provides 
a Quote-analogous to the TPMQuote, which is rooted to the 
physical TPM on the server. The measuring agent runs with the 
hypervisor on a host server and measures the VM images, per 
the manifest sent as part of the VM payload metadata. The MH 
quoting agent has the primitives to Quote, Seal, and Attest. Based 
on the VM trust policies, once the measurement and attestation of 
the VM image is completed, the decrypted image is passed on to 
the hypervisor to continue the normal launch sequence.
Encrypted virtual machine requests are identified using attributes present in an 
OVF envelope, similar to what is shown in Figure 8-3. The attributes indicate that the 
VM image is encrypted and show a URL where the decryption key can be obtained. The 
URL points to the KMS. When the MH plug-in requests the decryption key from the KMS, 
it provides the compute node’s attestation identity key, to request an attestation from 
Mt. Wilson. The section “Workflows for Trusted Virtual Machines” below describes the 
complete process.
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Note ■  The MH measuring agent could get complex, owing to the various virtual machine 
formats that would need to be comprehended. This would increase the TCB significantly. it 
is possible to migrate the measuring agent outside the TCB but still ensure its integrity. one 
way to accomplish this is to keep a hash of the measuring agent as part of the TCB, and to 
measure/attest the measuring agent before it is launched to perform the measurement of 
the VM image.
Trust Attestation Server
The trust attestation server is the attestation authority monitoring the compute nodes 
in the trusted data center, as described in detail in Chapter 4 and shown in Figure 8-4. 
The attestation server maintains the trust policy for every attested host and evaluates 
reports from the hardware roots of trust on each node to determine if each node is in 
compliance with its trust policy. The attestation server tracks the attestation identity key 
(AIK), public key, and an encryption public key for each compute node, among other 
information. When the KMS requests an attestation of a compute node that in turn 
requests a decryption key for an encrypted virtual machine, the MH key management 
server provides the AIK public key to the attestation server in order to uniquely identify 
the compute node to attest. The attestation server identifies the compute node to attest 
based on the provided AIK public key and returns the result to the KMS.
Figure 8-4. Attestation architecture
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Workflows for Trusted Virtual Machines
Figure 8-5 shows the flow of encryption, decryption, and launch of the virtual machines 
according to the conceptual architecture. The workflow builds upon the foundation 
established by the trusted compute pools to support virtualized cloud environments, 
adding the concept of trusted virtual machines. This is how the security capabilities 
and benefits of trusted compute pools are extended and become usable in virtualized 
cloud environments. Note that the elements in the workflow can be implemented in a 
distributed and scalable fashion under the cloud paradigm, in which Mt. Wilson and the 
KMS can be delivered through a PaaS provider, the cloud service provider and the hosts 
with Intel TXT are IaaS instances, and the cloud storage is a SaaS instance. There are nine 
steps involved in this workflow, noted as follows:
Figure 8-5. Encryption and decryption flow diagram for trusted virtual machines
Step 1: The launch of an encrypted virtual machine 
begins with creating an encryption key. The MH client can 
automatically generate new encryption keys as needed. Users 
have the flexibility of using the same key multiple times to 
protect different virtual machine images, or to create a new key 
for every virtual machine image. Every key that the MH client 
generates is wrapped and posted to the KMS so that it can 
later be retrieved for decryption. The corresponding key URL, 
provided by the KMS when the encryption key was wrapped 
and posted, is also stored by the MH client.
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Step 2: This involves selection of an encryption key and a 
plaintext virtual machine image, and subsequent encryption 
with the key. The encrypted virtual machine image can then 
be uploaded to servers in the data center. See the upper arrow 
to “Cloud Storage” in the flow diagram. The MH client attaches 
metadata to the virtual machine image—in particular for this 
case, the URL identifying the encryption key.
Step 3: Once the encrypted virtual machine image and 
associated metadata are posted in the cloud, the virtual 
machine can be launched using the cloud service provider’s 
existing mechanism for launching virtual machine workloads. 
This is noted in the diagram as “VM Launch Request.”
Step 4: Cloud service providers featuring trusted compute 
pools can query the trust status of a compute node and ensure 
that it is trusted before sending a new workload to it. This 
check is performed by sending an attestation request to the 
attestation server and inspecting the result. After identifying 
an available trusted compute node, the cloud service provider 
sends a launch request to that compute node with the 
encrypted virtual machine image information. The launch 
request includes the image metadata, image download URL, 
and decryption key URL. At this point, if the compute node 
does not have the MH plug-in, or has not been enabled with 
Intel TXT and registered with the attestation server, it will not 
be able to continue with the launch. The system prevents the 
encrypted image from even reaching the hypervisor.
Step 5: An Intel TXT-enabled trusted compute node with the 
MH plug-in can detect that the VM image is encrypted by 
examining the metadata or the OVF plug-in. The MH plug-in 
connects to the decryption key URL and sends the compute 
node’s AIK public key to that URL to identify the compute 
node that is requesting the decryption key. The URL points to 
the KMS, which already has the decryption key, wrapped by 
MH client.
Step 6: The attestation server looks up the compute node 
details using the AIK public key, obtains a TPM quote from 
the compute node, and verifies the compute node’s state 
against its trust policy. The result is reported back to the 
KMS. In addition, if the attestation server determines the 
compute node complies with its trust policy, the attestation 
server will then provide an asymmetric encryption public key 
for the compute node to the KMS, noted in the diagram as 
“BindPubKey.”
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Step 7: The KMS, upon receiving a favorable trust report on the 
compute node from the attestation server, wraps the requested 
decryption key and sends it back to the compute node. The key 
wrapping is done using the public key of the compute node, as 
provided by the attestation server. The compute node has the 
corresponding private key. It’s possible to bind the private key 
to the TPM on the compute node such that it can be used only 
if the host complies with its trust policy.
Steps 8, 9, and 10: The compute node unwraps the decryption 
key with the TPM, decrypts the encrypted VM, and as an 
additional step, can measure the virtual machine image and 
attest with the trust attestation authority before handing control 
to the compute node to proceed with the launch as usual.
As seen from this flow, the virtual machine image is protected at rest, in motion, and 
up until execution with protection under tenant control. The decryption keys are released 
only when the cloud service provider can demonstrate the integrity of the server on 
which the virtual machine is being provisioned.
Deploying Trusted Virtual Machines with 
OpenStack
Here, we document a reference implementation constructed to demonstrate trusted 
virtual machine usages with OpenStack. This proof point provides an opportunity 
to highlight the finer points of an actual implementation, allowing a more accurate 
evaluation of the value proposition, its applicability, and its usability. The reference 
implementation has been demonstrated at a number of industry-wide security 
conferences, including the OpenStack Summit, with excellent reviews. We expect the 
independent software vendor and cloud service provider community to scale production 
implementations of this usage to their own infrastructures—and ultimately to their 
service offerings—so as to offer a soup-to-nuts chain of trust, running from cloud 
service offerings all the way down the layers to the underlying host hardware. This 
implementation is an instantiation of the workflow described in the previous section.
Figure 8-6 shows the reference implementation in OpenStack. It works with 
OpenStack environments using either KVM or Xen hypervisors. A set of screenshots 
of the implementation follows, illustrating the flow and the process of integration into 
OpenStack.
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As shown in Figure 8-6, the process begins with creating the encryption keys to be 
applied to the virtual machine images. The goal is to implement a secure process under 
tenant control. The tenant or the service consumer, perhaps DevOps staff, uses the MH 
client to create keys, store them in the KMS, and encrypt the virtual machine images. In 
OpenStack, a virtual machine image is assumed to be in disk image format, ISO, vmdk, 
xva, or vhd. Although it is possible to upload encrypted virtual machine images manually 
to OpenStack Glance image service, and to use the Glance client to add the encryption 
metadata, it is far more convenient to let the MH client upload the encrypted virtual 
machine image and add the encryption flag and decryption key URL to the Glance image 
metadata using the Glance APIs.
As can be seen in Figure 8-7, there are two steps before an encrypted virtual machine 
can be uploaded to OpenStack Glance. First, either an existing key is selected or a new 
key is generated to use for encryption. The new key interfaces with the KMS. (For the 
reference implementation, no HSM was used with the KMS.) The KMS returns the 
URL and a decryption key ID (DKID) to be associated with the encrypted target virtual 
machine. Second, a virtual macine image to encrypt is selected and encrypted using the 
key just selected or generated. Third, the encrypted VM image is uploaded along with its 
encryption metadata to Glance, using the Glance client to upload the image and set its 
metadata in Glance.
Figure 8-6. Tenant-controlled virtual machine encryption and decryption with trusted  
launch in OpenStack
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The Launch tab, as shown in Figure 8-8, simulates a launch of a specific virtual 
machine. In practice this will be done either through use of OpenStack virtual machine 
launch APIs or from a portal such as OpenStack Horizon. The Launch tab features a 
single launch step and a progress monitor. To launch an encrypted virtual machine, the 
encrypted virtual machine image is selected from the list, a trusted flavor is chosen to 
use for the virtual machine instance, and the Launch button is clicked. The MH client 
reference implementation conveniently preselects the last virtual machine image 
encrypted in the Upload tab. The flavor list is downloaded from Nova Controller and 
reflects the same list as is available in the Horizon dashboard.
Figure 8-7. Selecting and binding a virtual machine image to an encryption key
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Note ■  Trusted compute pools (TCP) function, as described in chapter 3, has been  
implemented in openstack as scheduler filters. These extensions, and the Horizon  
dashboard and APi extensions to tag flavors with trustpolicies, have been part of openstack 
since the folsom release.
In the screenshot of the Launch tab, the selected flavor is m1.tiny.trusted, which 
in the reference implementation refers to a single virtual CPU, with 512 MB of memory, 
no extra disks, and a trust requirement from the attestation server. When a virtual image 
is launched with a trusted flavor, the trust scheduler in OpenStack Nova queries the 
attestation server for the trust status of available compute nodes and only selects trusted 
compute nodes for launching the virtual machine instance. When the Launch button in 
the Launch tab is clicked, the MH client uses the Nova client to request a launch of the 
selected encrypted virtual machine image using the selected flavor. The trust scheduler 
selects a trusted compute node and initiates a launch of the virtual machine image 
instance on that compute node.
Figure 8-8. Launching a virtual machine image
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The reference implementation integrates MH plug-in with the Nova compute node 
for KVM and Xen hypervisors. On KVM, the MH plug-in integrates with the libvirt driver 
(driver.py) on the compute node to intercept the launch request of an encrypted image, 
request the decryption key, and decrypt the image. On Xen, the MH plug-in integrates 
with the xapi.d plug-in for Glance (in dom0) to perform the same actions, but integrates 
the decryption into the image stream downloaded from Citrix into the Xen hypervisor’s 
work area.
When the MH plug-in requests the decryption key from the KMS, it sends an HTTP 
POST request to the decryption key URL noted in the image metadata. The body of 
the POST request is simply the AIK public key of the compute node. On KVM nodes, 
the AIK public key is managed by the trust agent, an additional component required 
for the attestation server. On Xen nodes, the AIK public key is managed by the Xen API 
performing the same functions as the trust agent.
The KMS forwards the AIK public key to the attestation server to obtain a report 
on that compute node. If the compute node is trusted, the report includes a public key 
that can be used for wrapping keys to be sent to the compute node. The corresponding 
private key is bound to the TPM on the compute node. The KMS wraps the decryption 
key using the compute node’s public key and sends it to the compute node. This 
mechanism ensures that the key can be unwrapped only by the compute node that 
was reported as trusted by the attestation server. This enables some flexibility on the 
part of the cloud service provider to anonymize, proxy, aggregate, or otherwise manage 
the decryption key requests without the risk of leaking the decryption key to any 
intermediate network node.
The MH plug-in receives and unwraps the decryption key, uses it to decrypt the 
encrypted VM image, measures the virtual machine image with additional primitives 
in DOM0, and attests to it with the attestation server. The attestation report from the 
attestation server indicates whether it can be launched. If so, the virtual machine launch 
continues as usual. In this reference implementation, the sequence of steps is reflected in 
the checkboxes on the Launch tab.
Summary
Building on the foundation of trusted compute pools, the concept of trusted virtual 
machines extends the chain of trust in the cloud computing environment to cover 
guest virtual machines and associated workloads. In this chapter we covered what 
trusted virtual machines mean, how a tenant can control the encryption and decryption 
keys, and how to protect the confidentiality and integrity of the virtual machines in 
transit, at rest, and up to execution, using encryption and decryption and other policy 
implementation techniques. We presented a reference architecture for realizing the 
vision of trusted virtual machines, and also reviewed a reference implementation of 
that architecture as it appears in OpenStack. Clearly, this implementation is very early 
in the industry’s process for realizing the full vision of trusted virtual machines. The 
need is there: users are demanding cloud providers to offer security for their virtual 
machines, while permitting cloud customers to retain control over encryption keys. 
They would also like to see decryption keys released only when the service provider can 
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demonstrate the integrity of the compute nodes on which the virtual machines are going 
to be deployed and launched. The model for trusted virtual machines showed how it is 
possible to bind decryption of the keys to the TPM on a server that has demonstrated 
integrity. This ensures that the virtual machine is decrypted only inside the trusted 
server and not anywhere else.
Intel has started to work with the community of independent software vendors and 
cloud service providers to develop the solutions that bring trusted virtual machine usages 
and associated technical architecture to scalable and production-ready offerings that can 
be used with private, public, and hybrid cloud deployments. Chapter 9 brings together all 
the concepts, usages, and technologies that we have reviewed in the first eight chapters, 
via a compelling usage model called “Secure Cloud Bursting.”
